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Article

Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the
Retreat from Election Law
Ellen Katz†
INTRODUCTION
Last Term the Supreme Court handed down four decisions
that upheld diverse efforts by state governments to regulate
the electoral process. The Court turned back challenges to New
York’s method for nominating judicial candidates,1 Washington’s modified blanket primary system,2 Indiana’s voter identification requirement,3 and Alabama’s use of gubernatorial appointment to fill county commission vacancies in Mobile
County.4
Unlike other recent election decisions,5 these were not close
cases. All nine Justices supported the New York holding,6 while
supermajorities voted in favor of the result in the others.7 This
consensus, moreover, emerged even as the Court voted to reverse unanimous decisions by experienced lower court judges in
the Alabama,8 New York,9 and Washington cases.10 The one af-

† Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Copyright ©
2009 by Ellen Katz.
1. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S.
Ct. 791 (2008).
2. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184
(2008).
3. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
4. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970 (2008).
5. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,
408 (2006) (5-4 decision).
6. See López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 794.
7. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613; Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at
1187; Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1976.
8. See Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1980.
9. See López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 797.
10. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1187.
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firmance came in the controversial Indiana voter ID case and
even there six Justices supported the outcome.11
These four decisions suggest that a distinct approach to
election law is emerging in the Roberts Court. It is an approach
that seeks to avoid active federal engagement with the statecreated rules regulating democratic participation; and it is one
that assumes and demands an electorate that is both legally literate and diligent. This approach differs in tenor and substance from the stance the Justices have long taken in electoral
disputes. It implicitly rejects the role the Court and Congress
have repeatedly played in the electoral arena, and the portrait
of the American voter on which federal involvement has previously been premised.
This short Article develops and defends these claims. Part
I shows how the recent decisions depart from both longstanding
and more recent precedent in the field. While the decisions facially overrule nothing, they narrow foundational voting decisions from the Warren and Burger Courts, and disavow the rigorous review the Rehnquist Court repeatedly employed when
examining challenges to state electoral processes. The decisions
suggest a Court that is eager to withdraw from engaged judicial
review of state election laws and receptive to circumscribed
federal oversight of state electoral processes more generally.
Part II shows how this federal withdrawal is animated by a
distinct conception of the American electorate. The decisions
last Term posit that voters did not need the federal assistance
the plaintiffs were seeking. They all assume that voters possess
a sophisticated understanding of the complex legal rules under
which they act, as well as both the ability and the diligence
needed to navigate those rules. Underlying decisions that reject
federal challenges to electoral rules, these assumptions become
permissible requirements for political participation.
The Justices know full well that a good portion of the
American electorate lacks the very characteristics on which
meaningful political participation now appears to depend. The
recent decisions make clear that the Court is no longer eager to
provide assistance when voters fall short. The expectation, implicit in these decisions, is that the void will be filled not by the
States themselves, but by political parties, other nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals. A brief conclusion explores this point.
11. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613.
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I. STEPPING BACK
This Part evaluates four election law decisions from last
Term. These decisions all rejected challenges to state efforts to
regulate the electoral process. In each case, precedent suggested, though did not require, a more robust federal role. By
letting the challenged regulations stand, all four decisions narrow prior precedent and minimize federal oversight of state
electoral processes.
A. NOMINATING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES
New York State Board of Elections v. López Torres, the first
of the four decisions the Court handed down last Term, presented the Justices with a constitutional challenge to the influence political party leaders exert within the hybrid system New
York State employs to nominate candidates to judicial office.12
This system relies on decentralized state-run primaries at
which party members choose delegates who then attend partyrun conventions that select the party’s nominee.13
Within this regime, local party leaders consistently choose
the ultimate nominee. They do so by coordinating a slate of loyal delegates to run in the primary and by ensuring these slates
satisfy New York’s hefty primary ballot access requirements.14
These requirements functionally block opposition to the party
slate,15 and thus the primary is routinely cancelled for lack of
12. López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2008).
13. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-134, -136(2)(i), -136(3), -160(2) (McKinney
2007).
14. Under New York law, delegates run in each of the numerous assembly
districts that comprise one of the State’s twelve judicial districts. See id. § 6124; López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections (López Torres I), 411 F. Supp.
2d 212, 220–21 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff ’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’d, N.Y.
State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
To be placed on the primary ballot, candidates for delegate must circulate designating petitions within the assembly district in which they are running.
López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 216 n.3. State law gives them thirty-seven
days to gather 500 valid signatures from party members who both reside in
that assembly district and who have not already signed another such petition.
§§ 6-134(3), (4), -136(2)(i), (3); López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections
(López Torres II), 462 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). Because these requirements routinely render many obtained signatures invalid, those seeking
access to the ballot must, as a matter of practice, obtain between 1000 and
1500 signatures to ensure obtaining the required number of valid ones. See
López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 220–21.
15. In New York’s Second Judicial District located in Brooklyn and Staten
Island, for example, a challenger candidate seeking to run a full slate of delegates and alternates would need to enlist nearly 250 people to run, and secure
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contest and the party slate is “deemed elected” pursuant to
state law.16 The delegates elected on the leadership’s slate invariably nominate the leadership’s candidates at rote conventions that last only minutes.17 Noncompetitive judicial districts
guarantee the nominee emerging from the majority party’s
convention will become a state supreme court justice.18
Two lower federal courts thought this regime gave too
much power to local party leaders. They found that the State
structured the nominating system in a manner that actively
and predictably gave party leaders ultimate control over the
nomination.19 Under it, judicial candidates like plaintiff Margarita López Torres—bona fide party members who meet the
qualifications for judicial office and enjoy considerable support
but are not favored in advance by the party leadership—are, in
the words of the district judge, wholly unable to “clear all the
hurdles necessary to elect supportive delegates,” and confront
“insurmountable” obstacles in seeking to lobby the delegates
who are selected.20
A unanimous Supreme Court, however, saw no constitutional defect.21 Some of the Justices seemed to think New
York’s regime was bad policy,22 but they all agreed that the
system was well within the realm of permissible structures a
State might employ when regulating the electoral process.23 No

124,000 qualified signatures from the twenty-four assembly districts that
comprise the Second Judicial District. See López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at
219. Accomplishing this would require obtaining nearly a quarter of a million
signatures, based on a “conservative” estimate of the number of signatures
that must be collected to ensure obtaining a sufficient number of valid ones.
See id.
16. § 6-160(2).
17. See López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 217, 223, 230.
18. See id. at 217 (“In most places, the nominees of a single party (either
Democratic or Republican) win all or virtually all of the time.”); see also López
Torres II, 462 F.3d at 178 (“Empirical evidence showed that because one-party
rule is the norm in most judicial districts, the general election is little more
than ceremony.”). The supreme courts of the State of New York are the state’s
trial-level courts.
19. See López Torres II, 462 F.3d at 181; López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d
at 231, 233. I agreed. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 2, N.Y. State
Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008) (No. 06-766).
20. López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 216–17.
21. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S.
Ct. 791 (2008).
22. Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 800–01 (majority opinion).
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precedent squarely blocked this holding, but several decisions
emerged narrowed as a consequence.
Most notably, López Torres examined New York’s regime
solely as state statutes describe it, and disregarded how it operates in practice. The Court never disagreed with the lower
courts’ finding that New York’s system is functionally impenetrable to challenger candidates and their supporters.24 What
mattered to the Justices, however, was that the process was
and remains legally accessible.25 As Justice Scalia pointed out,
“[n]o New York law” compels the election of the leadership’s
slate; no law directs those elected to vote the leadership’s preference; and no state law prohibits challenger candidates from
attending the convention or from lobbying the delegates.26
All this is true, to be sure. That the Court would, however,
explicitly and unanimously deem formal, legal accessibility sufficient to validate New York’s regime is something new. The
Justices have repeatedly claimed to have engaged in precisely
the type of analysis López Torres disavowed; that is, the Court
has said it focuses not only the “requirements themselves” but
also on “on the manner in which political actors function under
those requirements.”27 Bullock v. Carter accordingly emphasized that a candidate filing fee must be examined “in a realistic light” that includes “the extent and nature of the[] impact
on voters.”28 Chief Justice Burger explained that, under the
challenged regime, “potential office seekers . . . are in every
practical sense precluded from seeking the nomination of their
chosen party.”29 Rather than focusing exclusively on legal impediments, Bullock examined the system’s “real and appreciable impact,” stressing that to do otherwise would to be “ignore
reality” about the system’s effect in practice.30
Bullock was not an outlier on this point. Back in United
States v. Classic, the Court emphasized “the practical opera24. See id. at 800 (finding “one-party entrenchment” not a valid basis for
judicial interference).
25. See id. at 799.
26. Id.
27. Id.; cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 321–
22 (2007) (arguing that “the Court’s rhetoric . . . seems to invite all-thingsconsidered, empirically oriented burden inquiries,” but that in practice, “the
Court often reverts to formalism”).
28. 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 144.
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tion” of a primary election in controlling outcomes, even as it
observed the absence of any “effective legal prohibition” on voter rejection of the primary choice in the general election.31 Lubin v. Panish emphasized the need to examine “[t]he realities of
the electoral process,”32 and American Party of Texas v. White
rejected access that is “merely theoretical.”33 And as recently as
Clingman v. Beaver, Justice O’Connor called for a “realistic assessment of regulatory burdens on associational rights” and an
“examination of the cumulative effects of the State’s overall
scheme.”34
López Torres, by contrast, steadfastly refused to examine
the system’s cumulative effects and came close to embracing
what Justice Stevens’s dissent in Clingman described as “empty formalism.”35 No state law prevented a challenger candidate
like López Torres from attending the convention or lobbying
delegates,36 but the Court knew full well that in “every practical sense” she would be unable to do so.37 So too, the Court willingly “ignore[d] reality” and deemed “entirely reasonable” New
York’s requirement that a single candidate for delegate obtain
500 signatures before gaining access to the primary ballot.38
The legal obstacles to a successful standalone candidacy as a
convention delegate were certainly less onerous than those involved with securing the election of a coordinated slate, but, in
“every practical sense” pursuing such a standalone candidacy is
pointless, given the absence of debate and discussion at that
state-mandated convention.39
31. 313 U.S. 299, 313, 319 (1941).
32. 415 U.S. 709, 719 n.5 (1974).
33. 415 U.S. 767, 783 (1974) (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439
(1971)).
34. 544 U.S. 581, 599 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
35. See id. at 610 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the
assessment “should focus on the realities of the situation, not on empty formalism”); cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres:
Is the Right to Vote a Constitutional Constraint on Partisan Nominating Conventions?, 6 ELECTION L.J. 399, 409 (2007) (predicting that the Court would
not give “unqualified approval” to the “neither formalistic nor abstract” approach followed by the lower courts in Lopez Torres).
36. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128
S. Ct. 791, 799 (2008) (“[N]o state law prohibits an unsupported candidate
from attending the convention and seeking to persuade the delegates to support her.”).
37. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
38. See López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 799.
39. See López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections (López Torres I), 411 F.
Supp. 2d 212, 217, 223, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff ’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006),
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In López Torres, the Justices were nevertheless satisfied to
limit their gaze to formal legal access, and to ignore the burdens that arise in practice. In so doing, López Torres was not an
aberration. In the decisions that followed, the Court retained
this rigid focus on legal rather than practical impediments to
participation.
B. MODIFYING THE BLANKET PRIMARY
The Court’s next decision, Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party,40 was the most unexpected
of the four. Reversing two lower courts, the decision upheld as
constitutional the Washington state law known as the People’s
Choice Initiative (Initiative 872 or I-872).41 Court watchers
widely anticipated an affirmance.42
For decades, the State of Washington relied on the blanket
primary to select party nominees for elective office.43 Under
this system, the names of all the candidates from all parties
appeared on a single ballot, and voters choose among them, selecting, for instance, among the Democratic candidates for governor, and among the Republicans for senator.44 The candidate
with the highest votes by party for each office advanced to the
general election, as the respective party’s nominee.45 In 2003, a
federal court struck down Washington’s system, finding it “materially indistinguishable” from the blanket primary the Supreme Court invalidated three years earlier in California Democratic Party v. Jones.46 There, the Justices held that
California’s blanket primary impermissibly burdened the associational freedom of political parties because “it forced them to
allow nonmembers to participate in selecting the parties’ nominees.”47
rev’d, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. Ct.
791 (2008).
40. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184
(2008).
41. Id. at 1189–90.
42. See, e.g., In Shocker, Supreme Court on 7-2 Vote Upholds Washington
State Primary, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010463.html (Mar. 18, 2008,
07:25 PST).
43. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1187.
44. Id. at 1188.
45. Id. at 1188–90.
46. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th
Cir. 2003).
47. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1188.
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In 2004, voters in Washington State responded by adopting
I-872, which provides that all candidates for a “partisan office”
appear together on the primary ballot, with the two candidates
receiving the most votes overall advancing to the general election.48 This new, modified blanket primary resembles the nonpartisan primary that California Democratic Party described as
a permissible alternative to the blanket primary.49 Washington’s system, however, added the wrinkle that it allows candidates to list their party “preference” on both the primary and
general election ballots.50
Washington State Grange addressed whether this wrinkle
invalidated I-872.51 Two lower courts thought it did, noting that
the party-preference designation suggested the party had either endorsed or nominated a candidate when it had done neither.52 Observers widely agreed that California Democratic
Party controlled, and mandated the invalidation of I-872.53 Oral
argument in the Supreme Court suggested an affirmance would
be quickly forthcoming.54
The Justices nevertheless voted 7-2 to reverse.55 Justice
Thomas’s lead opinion emphasized that the I-872 primary did
not “by its terms” or “on its face” select party nominees, and
that the law made no reference to the top-two candidates “as
nominees of any party, nor does it treat them as such.”56 Pointing out that the challenge before the Court was a facial one,
48. Id. at 1189.
49. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 598 n.8 (2000).
50. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1189.
51. See id. at 1192–93.
52. See Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922
(W.D. Wash. 2005), aff ’d, 460 F.3d 1108, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
53. See, e.g., Joseph M. Birkenstock, Did I-872 Take Washington State’s
Voters on an Unconstitutional Detour?: Partisanship in Primaries in Washington v. Washington State Republican Party, 6 ELECTION L.J. 394, 398 (2007)
(questioning whether I-872 offered “a different route to the same destination
intended by the blanket primary,” namely, taking parties “out of the business”
of nominating candidates for office); Posting of Robert F. Bauer to American
Constitution Society for Law and Policy Blog, http://www.acsblog.org/guest
-bloggers-guest-blogger-does-washington-states-modified-blanket-primarysystem-violate-the-right-of-association.html (Oct. 1, 2007, 9:00 PST) (noting
that the State of Washington faced “serious obstacles in the path toward a Supreme Court victory”).
54. See Washington State Likely to Lose Top-Two Primary Case, http://
electionlawblog.org/archives/009403.html (Oct. 1, 2007, 11:34 PST).
55. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1187.
56. Id. at 1192.
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Justice Thomas rejected as “sheer speculation” the idea that
voters would view the top-two candidates as party nominees,
and found “simply no basis to presume that a well-informed
electorate” would misunderstand the system.57 Washington,
moreover, had yet to implement this regime, and careful ballot
design might well preclude the confusion plaintiffs argued
would arise.58
The decision notably suggested that the system might in
due course be challenged if implementation proved problematic.59 While the Court has long distinguished facial from asapplied challenges, invocation of the distinction in this context
was unusual.60 As Justice Scalia’s dissent pointed out,61 numerous decisions have examined restrictions on political participation and expressive association without requiring specific
evidence about the scope of the burden imposed.62 Washington
State Grange nevertheless demanded such evidence and appeared to be inviting the legal challenges that would present
it.63
The invitation is novel, but the innovation in practice
promises to be limited. Washington State Grange looks like it is
inviting a fact-intensive, time-consuming inquiry to assess how
voters understand the top-two primary in practice.64 Few such
inquiries, however, are likely to materialize. The Court in
Washington State Grange did not explain how voter confusion
might be assessed, but provided detailed recommendations of
things the State might do to minimize such confusion.65 Wash57. Id. at 1193.
58. See id. at 1194.
59. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, About Face: The Roberts Court Sets the Stage for
Shrinking Voting Rights, Putting Poor and Minority Voters Especially in Danger, FINDLAW, Mar. 26, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/
20080326_hasen.html.
60. Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy? The
Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1658–72
(2009) (discussing the Court’s use of as-applied challenges in the election law
context).
61. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000); Hurley
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 577 (1995); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
63. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1193.
64. See id.
65. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1194; id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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ington State might ultimately choose to disregard this advice,
and for instance, place the simple “D” or “R” next to the candidate’s name in the manner the Chief Justice’s concurrence suggested would be problematic.66 Assuming, however, the State
maintains a more compliant stance,67 a federal court is likely to
reject in short order an as-applied challenge to the regime. Litigation assessing survey data on voter perceptions remains
possible; more likely, a court will look exclusively at the State’s
effort and deem it sufficient.
Supporting this speculation is the Court’s refusal to
mandate the very thing that would most directly dispel voter
confusion, namely, allowing the party to disavow a candidate
on the ballot itself. Justice Scalia thought this refusal rendered
irrelevant all questions about implementation, insisting that
under “no set of circumstances” did the Washington regime not
severely burden political parties.68 Seven Justices disagreed
with him, and thereby implicitly accepted that political parties
are not impermissibly burdened by a primary structure designed to discourage what Justice Scalia called “bright-colors
partisanship.”69 Washington State Grange posits that the State
may rely on the top-two primary to advance this goal, and that
doing so causes political parties no cognizable injury absent
voter confusion. This proposition necessarily circumscribes the
scope of the as-applied challenge the decision invites to marginal issues, and ensures the impact of such challenges will be
negligible. Justice Scalia aptly described the task faced by
plaintiffs seeking to displace the regime once implemented as
“perhaps-impossible.”70
Rather than inviting a new, unpredictable foray into the
political thicket, Washington State Grange is better understood
as promoting an “exit strategy” from the aggressive review that
characterizes decisions like California Democratic Party.71
66. Id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
67. See WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, ANNOUNCING WASHINGTON STATE’S NEW
TOP 2 PRIMARY (2008), available at http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/
Documents/VP%20Top%202%20Primary%202008.pdf (explaining the top-two
primary with a sample ballot indicating which specific party a candidate “prefers”).
68. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1200 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1202; see also Bauer, supra note 53 (offering views on what the
top-two primary seeks to accomplish).
70. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1201 (Scalia J., dissenting).
71. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons
for Getting the Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 667 passim (2002) (discussing various views of such exit strategies).
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With reasoning that strongly suggested Washington’s top-two
primary should be invalid,72 California Democratic Party displaced a practice long used73 on the basis of a vigorous, and arguably undertheorized conception of party autonomy.74 Washington State Grange treats California Democratic Party as
settled precedent,75 but nevertheless narrows the decision by
letting stand (for now, at least) a practice that advances the
very same goal through a different, but hardly unrelated mechanism.
In this sense, Washington State Grange curiously resembles Easley v. Cromartie,76 the 2001 Rehnquist Court decision
that effectively brought to a close the racial redistricting disputes about which the Justices obsessed in the 1990s. Cromartie declined to apply strict scrutiny to an oddly shaped district
in which African Americans comprised 47 percent of the district’s population.77 After reviewing the record’s most minute
details, the Court concluded that partisanship best explained
the district lines, and therefore that race had not predominated
in the districting process.78 Commentators reacted to Cromartie
with skepticism,79 and some predicted that the Court’s factintensive approach would usher in even more intense federal
court involvement in racial redistricting disputes.80

72. See supra text accompanying notes 46, 49.
73. The practice was not, however, long used in California. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000) (describing the relatively recent adoption of the blanket primary by California voters).
74. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 274, 282–98 (2001); see also Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1188.
75. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1192.
76. 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001).
77. See id. at 240, 258.
78. See id. at 243–44.
79. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 496 (2002) (describing the
Court’s “predominant purpose” test as “indeterminate to the point of incoherence”); Karlan, supra note 71, at 677 (“[Cromartie] cannot be explained in any
sort of principled terms that provide guidance for future cases.”).
80. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569,
1593 (2002) (reading Cromartie as evidence that because the Court “seems to
have committed itself to conducting serious factual review, and that Shaw
cases will remain a stalking horse for various partisan interests, the deluge of
cases is likely to continue”).
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And yet, the deluge of racial gerrymandering challenges
anticipated after the post-2000 round of redistricting never materialized.81 While Cromartie analyzed the record in excruciating detail, the decision also provided significant guidance to
States working on redistricting plans, instructing them, in effect, to tone down racial references, use race less bluntly, and
rely on party affiliation to the extent possible when drawing
district lines.82 By and large, States heeded the advice, with the
tight connection between race and political affiliation enabling
informed line drawers to immunize most districting plans from
constitutional challenges.83
Washington State Grange promises to function similarly.
The decision reads like a “dodge,”84 inviting what appears to be
an expansive, time consuming project that will burden the federal courts. But the decision provides advice much like that offered less expressly in Cromartie. If heeded, this advice promises to limit, rather than encourage, federal court involvement in
future disputes.
The Court, no doubt, intends as much. Following on the
heels of López Torres, the decision continues the Court’s reluctance to mire itself in the minutiae of state election law. To be
sure, López Torres let stand a regime that greatly empowered
party organizations, while Washington State Grange preserved
a state regime that actively sought to undermine those same
entities. Uniting the two, however, is the Court’s commitment
to stay out of it.
C. REQUIRING VOTER IDENTIFICATION
By far the most prominent of the election disputes before
the Court last Term, Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board85 synthesized key elements of the Court’s approach in
the two previous cases. Crawford continued the Court’s rigid
focus on legal restrictions over practical effects, making clear
that López Torres was not an aberration on this point.86 Craw81. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term–Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 67 n.172
(2004).
82. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001).
83. See Pildes, supra note 81, at 67–68.
84. Bob Bauer, Political Parties in the Soup, at the Supreme Court, MORE
SOFT MONEY HARD LAW, Mar. 19, 2008, http://moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/
updates/the_supreme_court.html?Archive=1&AID=1221.
85. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
86. Id. at 1622–23.
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ford, moreover, followed Washington State Grange both by distinguishing facial from as-applied challenges, and by suggesting the latter will encompass few, if any, successful claims.87
Crawford affirmed the validity of the Indiana voter identification requirement88 many observers deemed to be the most
severe of the ID requirements states have enacted in recent
years.89 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy,
Justice Stevens’s lead opinion held that the State’s interest in
things like preventing voter fraud and protecting voter confidence justified the burdens the requirement imposed.90 The
opinion noted the plaintiffs’ allegation that “a small number of
voters . . . may experience a special burden under the statute,”
but found no basis in the record to quantify either the burden’s
magnitude or the portion of it that is “fully justified.”91 The
record as it stood, Justice Stevens wrote, did not support the allegation that the statute imposed “excessively burdensome requirements,” emphasizing that “[a] facial challenge must fail
where the statute has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’”92
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas, agreed
that Indiana’s law was valid, but thought the inquiry should be
a categorical one in which the “peculiar circumstances of individual voters” were legally irrelevant.93 According to Justice
Scalia, Indiana’s voter ID requirement imposed a single burden
on all voters, namely to present photo identification in order to
vote in person.94 The reality that some voters will be able to
comply more easily than others simply reflects “the different
impacts of the single burden” uniformly imposed, and not multiple burdens that warrant particularized judicial scrutiny.95
Justice Scalia nevertheless concurred in the judgment because

87. Id.
88. Id. at 1624.
89. See It Could Have Been Worse, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/
2008_04_01_equalvote_archive.html (Apr. 29, 2008, 06:53 EST) (referring to
Indiana’s law as “probably the strictest and most exclusionary voter ID law in
the country”).
90. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617–21.
91. Id. at 1622.
92. Id. at 1623 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican
Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008)).
93. Id. at 1624 –25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
94. See id. at 1625.
95. See id.
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he deemed the single burden at issue imposed by the state law
to be “minimal and justified.”96
Justice Souter, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Ginsburg, catalogued the various difficulties voters lacking
conventional forms of ID would confront in seeking to comply
with the statute, and argued that these difficulties gave rise to
“an unreasonable and irrelevant burden.”97 Justice Breyer also
dissented, emphasizing why he thought the Indiana regulation,
as distinct from voter ID generally, imposed peculiar and disproportionate burden on voters lacking conventional forms of
identification.98
With four separate opinions, no majority opinion, and indisputably heated rhetoric among the Justices who wrote,
Crawford would seemingly provide unlikely support for the
claim that a new consensus to election law is emerging in the
Roberts Court.99 And yet, substantial consensus there was, at
least among the six Justices who voted to affirm.100
First, none of these Justices thought the strict standard
from Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections controlled.101 Harper applied rigorous review to strike down Virginia’s $1.50 poll
tax, deeming it an invidious and unjustified voter qualification.102 Justice Douglas’s majority opinion struck down the poll
tax law on its face and was indifferent to the fact that many
voters presumably could comply with the requirement without
difficulty.103 Justice Stevens’s opinion in Crawford cited Harper,104 but never really explained why Indiana’s identification
requirement is not functionally like a poll tax. Justice Scalia
cited Harper in a manner that suggested an intent to limit the
decision to its facts.105
96. Id. at 1624.
97. Id. at 1643 (Souter, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1643–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. See It Could Have Been Worse, supra note 89 (describing the Court’s
decision as splintered and stating that “Crawford accentuates the lack of coherence in the Court’s jurisprudence when it comes to election law”).
100. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613, 1624.
101. See, e.g., id. at 1615–16, 1624.
102. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 670 (1966).
103. See Hasen, supra note 59.
104. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615–16.
105. Id. at 1626 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e have never held that legislatures must calibrate all election laws, even those totally unrelated to money, for their impacts on poor voters.”); see also It Could Have Been Worse, supra note 89.
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As important, all six Justices voting to affirm in Crawford
appeared to agree that Indiana could permissibly make voting
more difficult for a select class of voters. Justice Scalia said so
emphatically,106 but Justice Stevens accepted the idea as well,
albeit less explicitly.107 Following Washington State Grange,
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Crawford left open the prospect of
an as-applied challenge, while intimating that almost all of the
conduct the plaintiffs challenged was permissible.108 Indeed,
Crawford, more forcefully than Washington State Grange, suggested that few, if any, as-applied challenges will succeed.109
Justice Stevens identified several classes of voters for
whom the ID requirement imposed “a somewhat heavier burden” and made voting more difficult: the elderly, the homeless,
those for whom “economic or other personal limitations” interfere with acquisition of a birth certificate or other documents
needed to obtain state-issued identification, and voters who refused to be photographed for religious reasons.110 The opinion,
however, found the record insufficient to allow the Court to
“quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow
class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them
that is fully justified.”111
This statement indicates some openness to the possibility
that better evidence might establish a severe and unjustified
burden, at least for some discrete groups of voters. But the opinion also repeatedly suggests that such a burden would arise
only if voters found themselves wholly unable to vote.112 At
several junctures, Justice Stevens emphasized that the admittedly “heavier” burden some voters confront was also a surmountable one, both because the law provided varied ways for
voters to comply, and because, in practice, the limited evidence
collected showed that some informed and diligent voters were
in fact able to comply.113

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1625.
Id. at 1621–24 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1622–24.
Id. at 1621.
Id. at 1622.
Id. at 1613–14, 1620–23.
Id. at 1621–22.
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The record in Crawford was indisputably thin.114 But it
was nevertheless sufficient to reinforce what the Indiana law
did on its face: namely, it made voting more difficult for a discrete class of voters. The law required additional effort from
some, and the effort required was far from inconsequential. The
issue of whether Indiana may lawfully do so was debatable before Crawford, but not afterward, given Justice Stevens’s apparent comfort with the idea. So long as voters lacking conventional ID do not claim “a personal inability to vote,” they
apparently have no cause for complaint, and an unwillingness
to take the inconvenient steps the law requires does not
amount to an “inability” to vote.115
By suggesting (and perhaps holding) that voters dissuaded
but not wholly precluded from voting suffer no cognizable injury, the plurality opinion seems to reject the core injury the
plaintiffs alleged in the lawsuit. As Professor Dan Tokaji explained, the alleged injury was not that the burdens imposed by
the ID requirement were wholly insurmountable.116 Some voters will, of course, “go through the hoops” to obtain the ID, but
others will not “wait in a line at the BMV to get photo ID, only
to wait in another in order to vote.”117
Those last voters will not vote in Indiana. Crawford finds
no constitutional defect with a system that has this effect,118
and was designed with awareness of it,119 and arguably specifically to produce it. In this sense, Crawford follows López
Torres, in that both decisions focus rigidly on legal rather than
practical impediments to participation.120 Because Indiana’s
law did not wholly preclude anyone from voting, but instead
imposed steps to be taken by voters lacking the requisite ID,121
a sufficiently informed and diligent voter lacking conventional
ID should still be able to vote. That the law indisputably
114. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo: At Supreme Court, 5-to4 Rulings Fade, but Why?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A1 (calling the record
“nonexistent”).
115. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621–22.
116. It Could Have Been Worse, supra note 89.
117. Id.
118. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624.
119. See id. at 1623–24.
120. See id.; see also N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López
Torres III), 128 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2008).
121. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621–23; John Fund, Sister Act: Is Indiana Really Disfranchising Elderly Nuns?, WSJ.COM, May 8, 2008, http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB121018485894374391.html?mod=opinion_journal_political_
diary.
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created obstacles that many voters simply will not overcome122—not because compliance is wholly impossible, but because it is burdensome—was of no consequence.
Diligence might arguably be a proper prerequisite to participation, at least if concerns about fraud and its perception
factor into the calculus.123 Justice Stevens seemed to think so,
but never quite said as much. Instead, he seemed content, as
was the Court in López Torres, to concentrate on formal legal
access,124 with little concern for the practical burdens that arise
under the system. The approach gives States license to structure electoral processes to impose barriers to participation, subject only to the most limited constraint that they not be legally
impossible to traverse. Reality no longer has anything to do
with it.125
D. RESTORING EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT
Unlike López Torres, Washington State Grange, and Crawford, Riley v. Kennedy was a purely statutory case. While the
question it addressed under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was
obscure, the decision advanced an approach that complements
the stance underlying the three election cases that preceded it.
Like the others, Riley suggests a retreat from the federal regulation of state elections, although the Riley Court cut back not
on its own role but instead narrowly construed the reach of a
federal statute that it had previously interpreted expansively.126

122. Cf. Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Hey, What About the 24th?,
SLATE, May 2, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2190372 (noting that the Indiana
law creates additional burdens of money, time, and effort that may amount to
humiliation on the part of the voter).
123. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617, 1618–21; id. at 1636 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“There is no denying the abstract importance, the compelling nature,
of combating voter fraud.”).
124. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623–24 (plurality opinion).
125. See Vikram David Amar, What the Supreme Court’s Recent Decision
Upholding Indiana’s Voter ID Law Tells Us About the Court, Beyond the Area
of Election Law, FINDLAW, May 8, 2008, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/
20080508.html (“It doesn’t take a genius to see that relegating plaintiffs to ‘as
applied’ challenges in these kinds of cases doesn’t really leave them with
much.”); Hasen, supra note 59 (commenting pre-Crawford that if the Court
upholds the Indiana law, “poor and minority voters will hardly have a
chance”).
126. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1982–87 (2008).
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Riley involved a factually complex dispute arising under
the VRA.127 Distilled to its most basic facts, the dispute concerned the status under the VRA of a 1985 Alabama law that
required that midterm vacancies on the Mobile County Commission be filled by special election rather than gubernatorial
appointment, as had been the prior practice.128 In 1988, the Alabama Supreme Court struck down the 1985 law as a violation
of the Alabama State Constitution, but only after a special election had already been held and the victor served approximately
fourteen months on the County Commission.129 Riley presented
the question whether Alabama could resume filling midterm
vacancies by executive appointment without first obtaining
federal approval to do so.130
As a covered jurisdiction under the VRA,131 Alabama must
obtain federal approval, known as preclearance, before implementing a change to any election practice that is “in force or effect.” Filling by appointment an office previously filled by election is a type of electoral change that has been long held to
require federal preclearance.132 Alabama did not dispute this in
Riley, and instead maintained that the 1985 law mandating
elections to fill midterm vacancies in the Mobile County Commission had never been “in force or effect” within the meaning
of the VRA.133 The law was challenged as a violation of the
state constitution at the first moment a challenge was possible,
and while the trial court initially upheld it, the Alabama Supreme Court subsequently struck it down.134 In these circumstances, the State argued, the invalidated election law should
not be the baseline against which the return to gubernatorial
appointment should be measured.135
A three-judge federal district court disagreed. Judge Myron
H. Thompson’s brief opinion for the unanimous panel suggested
the judges thought the case was straightforward.136 Citing
127. Id. at 1976–82.
128. Id. at 1978.
129. Id. at 1978–79.
130. Id. at 1976.
131. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(a) (West Supp. 2008).
132. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550–51, 569–72
(1969).
133. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1982–87.
134. Id. at 1978–79.
135. See id. at 1979–80.
136. See Kennedy v. Riley, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (M.D. Ala. 2006), rev’d,
Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970 (2008).
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what the panel viewed as settled precedent, Judge Thompson
found that the 1985 Act had been “put into force and effect”
when a new commissioner was elected pursuant to it, and accordingly constituted the baseline practice against which executive appointment should be evaluated.137
The Supreme Court reversed in a 7-2 vote.138 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court sympathized with the awkward position in which the State found itself. After the District Court’s
order, the Justice Department objected to Alabama’s preclearance submission, finding that the resumption of gubernatorial
appointment “appears to diminish the opportunity of minority
voters to elect a representative of their choice to the Mobile
County Commission.”139 The State consequently found itself
needing to fill a commission vacancy with an election that the
Alabama Supreme Court had previously held would violate the
state constitution.140
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion holds that the election was not
required because preclearance was not necessary. Acknowledging that precedent supported the lower court’s holding, she
wrote that the dispute would be “a close case” but for an “extraordinary circumstance” that “impel[s]” the conclusion that
the 1985 Act was never “in force or effect.”141 This case, wrote
Justice Ginsburg, was different from the relevant precedent because it involved a state electoral practice that had both been
challenged “at first opportunity,” and had been invalidated by
the state supreme court.142 In this “circumstance,” the Court
found that the Act had never been “in force or effect,” and thus
preclearance was not required.143
By placing dispositive weight on a “circumstance” the
Court had not previously confronted, Justice Ginsburg sought
to limit the holding to the odd facts Riley presented.144 But
while Riley offered a narrow ruling in an unusual case, aspects
137. Id. at 1336 (citing City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 133
(1983)).
138. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1976.
139. Letter from Wan J. Kim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Troy King, Att’y Gen., State of Ala. and John J. Park, Jr.,
Assistant Att’y Gen., State of Ala. 3 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www
.votelaw.com/blog/blogdocs/DOJ objection letter 2007 01 08.pdf.
140. See Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1978–80.
141. Id. at 1984.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1976, 1984.
144. See id.
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of both the majority and dissenting opinions suggest a new approach to the VRA that supplements the stance the Roberts
Court took in the constitutional election decisions earlier last
Term.
Most prominently, and as noted by Justice Stevens in dissent, the majority’s approach failed to give Section 5 of the VRA
the “broadest possible scope”145 and hence was “not faithful” to
precedent that has long shown the Court inclined to do just
that.146 The Roberts Court might well have been expected to
stray from an interpretative mandate the Warren Court announced nearly four decades ago. The Court’s stance in Riley,
however, also departed from that of the Rehnquist Court on the
specific statutory question presented in the case. With only one
significant exception,147 the Rehnquist Court repeatedly construed Section 5 broadly when confronted with the question
whether a change was of the sort for which preclearance was required. In case after case, the Court expanded the types of decisions subject to preclearance and stiffened the penalties for a jurisdiction’s failure to obtain it.148
Prominent among these decisions is the Rehnquist Court’s
1999 decision in Lopez v. Monterey County, California.149 Ac-

145. Id. at 1987 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
146. Id.
147. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 494, 504 (1992)
(holding section five inapplicable to a resolution altering the powers exercised
by elected county commissioners because applying section five to such changes
would work “an unconstrained expansion of its coverage,” given that
“[i]nnumerable” local enactments unrelated to voting affect the power of
elected officials).
148. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey County, Cal., 525 U.S. 266, 280–82, 287
(1999); Foreman v. Dallas County, Tex., 521 U.S. 979, 980 (1997); Young v.
Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 290–91 (1997); Lopez v. Monterey County, Cal., 519
U.S. 9, 22–25 (1996); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 200–06,
210 (1996); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652–55, 660 (1991); City of Pleasant
Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 471 (1987). See generally Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1179, 1208–10
(2001) (discussing trends of the Rehnquist Court when confronted with section
five issues). However, the Rehnquist Court repeatedly has construed the VRA
narrowly when addressing the distinct question of whether a change in electoral practice met the necessary substantive standard for implementation. See
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477–82 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 328–36 (2000); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 95–98
(1997); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997); Katz, supra,
at 1209–10.
149. 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
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knowledging the “substantial ‘federalism costs’”150 resulting
from the VRA’s “federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state
and local policymaking,”151 Lopez recognized that the Reconstruction Amendments “contemplate” this encroachment into
realms “traditionally reserved to the States.”152 Lopez affirmed
as constitutionally permissible the infringement that the VRA’s
Section 5 preclearance process “by its nature” effects on state
sovereignty,153 and applied Section 5 broadly, finding that a
county’s nondiscretionary implementation of state law must be
precleared.154
Nine years later, Riley adopted a very different stance
when the Court again confronted the question of whether a
challenged electoral practice must be precleared prior to implementation. Absent from Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion
is Lopez’s reflexive acceptance of Section 5’s “federal intrusion”
into state sovereignty.155 In its place is remarkable concern
about the very federalism costs that the Court in Lopez so willingly tolerated.156 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg worried that
mandating preclearance in Riley would interfere too greatly
with the power of the Alabama Supreme Court, and, by extension, with state supreme courts more generally.157 Mandating
preclearance, she wrote, effectively rendered the decision of the
Alabama Supreme Court “inoperative,” and “would have the
anomalous effect of binding Alabama to an unconstitutional
practice because of a state trial court’s error.”158 Such a
mandate “interfere[d] with a state supreme court’s ability to
determine the content of state law,” and hence gave rise to a
distinct “burden.”159 Justice Ginsburg stated that “the prerogative of the Alabama Supreme Court to say what Alabama law is
merits respect in federal forums.”160
Justice Ginsburg, of course, had said this before. Her discussion in Riley closely tracked her dissent in Bush v. Gore,
where she lambasted the Court for failing to defer to the judg150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 282 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995)).
Id.
Id. (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)).
Id. at 284 –85.
Id. at 282, 287.
Id. at 282.
Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1985–86 (2008).
Id.
Id. at 1985.
Id. at 1986.
Id. at 1985.
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ment of another state supreme court on what she understood to
be question of state law.161 In his concurrence, Chief Justice
Rehnquist had invoked several Warren Court decisions that he
argued supported a federal judicial role in the presidential dispute.162 Justice Ginsburg responded by berating the Chief Justice for “bracket[ing]” the Florida Supreme Court with “state
high courts of the Jim Crow South.”163
Riley showed Justice Ginsburg again defending a state supreme court, this time the Alabama Supreme Court. She
pointed out the absence of any suggestion that the Alabama
Supreme Court’s decisions “were anything other than reasonable and impartial interpretations of controlling Alabama
law.”164 She dismissed the dissent’s invocation of the Alabama
Supreme Court’s complicity in the State’s Jim Crow past, noting that the past misdeeds of the Alabama Supreme Court
would have been subject to preclearance, had the VRA existed
at the time, while the Court’s decision in Riley was simply different, falling outside what constitutes a “change” within the
meaning of the VRA.165
Justice Ginsburg’s consistency with regard to state court
power would seem unremarkable, but for the fact that Riley
was a VRA preclearance case. As the VRA’s most notorious and
remarkable provision, the preclearance requirement reverses
the presumption of validity that typically attaches to state and
local governmental action, and mandates that jurisdictions subject to it obtain federal approval before changing any aspect of
their electoral laws.166 Underlying this regime is the belief that
state power in the voting realm—including state judicial power—is suspect until the State can demonstrate otherwise.167
Under this regime, Justice Ginsburg’s confidence in the
judgment of the state supreme court in Riley was misplaced—
not because it was factually inaccurate, but because it was legally preempted. The premise of the VRA’s preclearance requirement is that decisions by covered jurisdictions are, by de161. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 136 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 114 –15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
163. Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1986 n.12.
165. Id. at 1987 n.13.
166. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(a) (West Supp. 2008).
167. Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political
Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER
183, 183 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007).
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finition, suspect. While this premise alone does not resolve
whether Alabama’s return to gubernatorial appointment should
have been deemed a change subject to preclearance, it suggests
that neither the state court’s sound judgment nor its need for
autonomy provide grounds to exempt the change from the strictures of preclearance.
Or at least it did. After Riley, all nine Justices appear unconvinced. Justice Ginsburg, speaking for herself and six others, protected Alabama’s power to resume a practice that the
Department of Justice refused to preclear given its potential
discriminatory effect on minority voters.168 Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Souter in dissent, would have retained federal
review, but only reluctantly.169 The dissent wonders in dicta
whether “it may well be true that today . . . maintaining strict
federal controls . . . [is] not as necessary or appropriate as [it
once was].”170 Riley accordingly exposes the Court’s deep skepticism about the VRA and the continued federal intervention it
mandates in state electoral affairs.
II. REDEFINING THE ELECTORATE:
LEGAL LITERACY AND VOTER DILIGENCE
López Torres, Washington Grange, Crawford, and Riley all
limited federal involvement in state electoral disputes by making clear that voters were not entitled to the federal assistance
the plaintiffs sought in each case.171 Underlying all four is a
distinct portrait of the American voter. Specifically, these decisions advance the idea that voters must be both legally literate
and diligent.
A. LEGAL LITERACY
Formal literacy tests have long been outlawed,172 and the
recent decisions hardly suggest a desire to resurrect such tests.
They nevertheless both assume and require that voters engaged in the political process possess a sophisticated under168. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1976, 1980, 1982, 1984.
169. Id. at 1987, 1993–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1987.
171. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1982, 1984 (majority opinion); Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623–24 (2008); Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193, 1196 (2008); N.Y. State
Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. Ct. 791, 799–801
(2008).
172. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966).
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standing of the rules that govern elections. The decisions from
last Term credit voters with knowing and understanding the
law in considerable detail, and with grasping the significance of
complex legal developments. In short, they render meaningful
political participation dependent on legal literacy.
The importance of legal literacy emerges nascently in
López Torres with the decision’s replacement of “realism” review with an exclusive focus on legal rather than practical burdens.173 Through this circumscribed lens, the challenged regulations are not obviously burdensome. To be sure, the district
court in López Torres found that that the state’s ballot access
requirements were functionally insurmountable, the existing
primary system a nullity, and the lobbying of delegates fruitless,174 and the Supreme Court never disputed these findings.
The Court held, however, that state law was not the cause, or
more precisely, was not the direct cause, and that the burdens
observed stemmed most directly from decisions by party leaders to do things like run a coordinated slate of delegates incapable of deliberation.175 López Torres suggests that if party
members are unhappy with such practices, they should change
them or replace the leaders who implemented them.176 Doing
so, of course, requires that party members—as voters and challenger candidates—understand which parts of the nomination
process are state-mandated, and which are derived from party
practice in response to those mandates. López Torres expects
party members to understand that state law is not the direct
cause of the problems that exist. The suggestion is that a legally literate voter can be expected to so understand.
The concept of legal literacy emerges in more developed
form in Washington State Grange. Emphasizing the facial nature of the challenge, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion rejects
as “sheer speculation” the notion that voters might be confused
by a candidate’s party preference and might view such a candidate as the party’s approved nominee.177 Justice Thomas said
explicitly that “a well-informed electorate” should not be pre173. López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 797–99.
174. See López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections (López Torres I), 411 F.
Supp. 2d 212, 216, 248, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff ’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006),
rev’d, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. Ct.
791 (2008).
175. See López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 799.
176. See id. at 799–80.
177. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184,
1193 (2008).
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sumed to make such an error.178 This electorate would know
that the party designation is a preference, not a nomination,
because, in fact, that is what the law says. The law, after all,
never referred to the top-two candidates “as nominees of any
party, nor does it treat them as such.”179 Well-informed voters
are presumed to be aware of this.
No such presumption attached eight years earlier when the
Court decided California Democratic Party v. Jones.180 That decision struck down the blanket primary as intrusion on party
autonomy, in part because participation by nonmembers
threatened to alter the identity or qualities of the ultimate party nominee.181 A well-informed electorate would presumably
have understood and appreciated that the nominee who prevails in the blanket primary may well be different from the one
securing the nomination when primaries are wholly closed.
Such victors were legally designated party nominees, to be
sure, but well-informed voters would presumably understand
that nominees differ depending on the legal regime that allows
for their selection. The Court in California Democratic Party
nevertheless expressed no interest in what the electorate might
know or could be expected to understand, and instead struck
down the law as unduly burdensome on a facial challenge.182
Washington State Grange, by contrast, preserved a closely related law by crediting the understanding of an informed electorate versed in legal nuance.183
Riley v. Kennedy likewise assumed a legally literate electorate. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion made clear that not every situation in which a state law is found to violate the state constitution would be immune from the strictures of preclearance.
Instead, she emphasized that narrow and specific circumstances had rendered Section 5 inapplicable to the Alabama dispute.184 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the state law that attempted to supplant gubernatorial appointment with special
elections to fill midterm vacancies in the Mobile County Commission “was challenged in state court at first opportunity, the
lone election was held in the shadow of that legal challenge,
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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530 U.S. 567 (2000).
Id. at 581–82.
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See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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and the Act was ultimately invalidated by the Alabama Supreme Court.”185
All three conditions are apparently required to detach the
preclearance obligation, but it is the second that is most interesting for present purposes. Why should the fact that the election occurred in the “shadow of [a] legal challenge”186 matter?
Justice Ginsburg offered no explanation, but one possibility is
that this “shadow” informed voters that the new law had yet to
supplant fully the prior practice. The pending legal dispute
meant the ultimate status of the election law remained unsettled. Its “shadow” told voters that the election in which they
were voting was a tenuous and possibly fleeting participatory
experience.
In other words, the “shadow” of the legal dispute insulated
minority voters from experiencing the harm the preclearance
requirement guards against, namely, electoral changes that
diminish opportunities for minority political participation.
While a move from elections to appointment is a classic example of such a “retrogressive” change,187 Riley posits that the ultimate invalidity of the election law caused no retrogression in
Mobile.188 The “shadow” hanging over the election in which minority voters participated informed them that their voting experience was provisional at best. It provided notice that the return to appointment took away nothing from their participatory
opportunities.
Some voters may have grasped the significance of the lawsuit’s “shadow.” But doing so required knowledge that a lawsuit
had been filed that called the election into question, that a
state trial court’s dismissal of that lawsuit prior to the election
did permanently establish the law’s validity, and that the pending appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court was sufficient to
render the election’s status uncertain. Only the most legally literate voter could be expected to make such observations. Indeed, even the three-judge district court missed the last point.
B. VOTER DILIGENCE
Diligence emerges as a prerequisite to voting most explicitly in Crawford. Justice Stevens’s lead opinion posits that voters
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1984.
Id.
See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1969).
See Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1984.
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lacking conventional forms of identification need not necessarily suffer an undue burden under the identification law because
various venues exist through which a diligent voter might secure ID, or otherwise validate a provisional ballot cast without
identification.189
Justice Stevens acknowledged, for instance, that Indiana’s
regime created “difficulty” for some elderly voters lacking birth
certificates, but highlighted how one named plaintiff was able
to obtain her birth certificate, had the ability to pay the birth
certificate fee, and “intended” to return to the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles to get her identification.190 Justice Stevens also
pointed out that the absence of public transportation in parts of
Indiana was irrelevant because that absence indicated nothing
about how frequently the poor and elderly might venture to the
BMV “during a routine outing with family or friends” or on visits arranged by private civic and political groups.191
Justice Stevens also pointedly noted that any burden imposed by the ID requirement “is, of course, mitigated” by the
ability of voters without qualifying ID to cast provisional ballots and have them counted, so long as the voter visited a circuit court clerk’s office within ten days of the election to execute
an affidavit about why they lacked the requisite identification.192 Justice Stevens said that this requirement was “unlikely . . . [to] pose a constitutional problem,” save perhaps for voters who refused to be photographed for religious reasons, and
hence would have to make this circuit court trip for every election.193
In short, Justice Stevens seemed to recognize that Indiana’s law made voting more difficult for some voters, that the
effort needed to comply was facially significant, and that the
requirements might dissuade some voters from voting.194 So
long, however, as these voters do not find themselves wholly
unable to vote, the plurality opinion suggested they suffered no
cognizable injury.195 Diligence emerges as a functional and
permissible prerequisite to voting.
189.
(2008).
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CONCLUSION
Last Term’s decisions suggest a systematic move by the
Roberts Court to abandon active review of state electoral procedures and to curb federal regulation of such processes more
generally. This suggestion, of course, may be illusory. Supreme
Court decisions are easy to over-read and intentions may erroneously be attributed to Justices who never harbored such sentiments.
But insofar as a new, unified approach to election law is
emerging, last Term’s decisions suggest it has at least two
prominent features. The approach makes meaningful political
participation contingent on knowledge and skills that many
voters simply lack. Legal literacy and diligence have become
functional prerequisites to voting. The new approach, moreover, promises little and perhaps no federal assistance when
voters fall short in what is required.
The Justices, of course, know that voters will fall short.
The decisions allude to this circumstance and anticipate various actors will emerge to fill the void. The Court suggests that
political parties have appropriate incentives to assist voters as
they navigate the system—hence the standing granted to the
Democratic Party in Crawford196—and to ensure that voters
properly understand the legal regimes within which they act—
by, for instance, making clear the significance of a candidate’s
party preference in Washington’s top-two primary.197
The Court, however, seems to envision assistance by others
as well. In Crawford, Justice Stevens made reference to the
employees who staff homeless shelters, relatives and friends
inclined to orchestrate outings to the BMV for elderly voters,
and the staff of civic and political organizations.198 These are
the people who thus far have prevented Indiana’s voter ID requirement from becoming unduly burdensome, at least in a facial challenge, and it is their anticipated assistance that will
likely lead the Court to turn back any as-applied challenge that
might be brought.199
196. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th
Cir. 2007) (finding that the “Democratic Party . . . has standing to assert the
rights of those of its members who will be prevented from voting by the new
law”).
197. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184,
1192–93 (2008).
198. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623 n.20.
199. See supra notes 190, 191 and accompanying text.
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The election decisions from the 2007 Term anticipate that
private individuals will play an increasingly crucial role within
election law. While such assistance hardly signals the wholesale privatization of election administration, it reveals an implicit delegation of power. As the Court retreats from its
longstanding role as the primary guardian of voting rights, private individuals and organizations are emerging as the most
likely replacement.

